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EUROPEAN UNION DATA PROTECTION LAW AND MEDIA EXPRESSION:  FUNDAMENTALLY OFF 
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The European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC requires all European Economic Area (EEA) 
jurisdictions to provide an equivalent regime protecting the privacy and other fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons in relation to personal data processing, whilst also shielding media 
expression from the default substantive requirements as necessary to ensure a balance between 
fundamental rights. Through a comprehensive coding of the derogations set out in each jurisdiction’s 
data protection laws, this paper provides the first systematic analysis of whether this has in fact been 
achieved. It is demonstrated that there is a total lack of even minimal harmonization in this area, 
with many laws providing for patently unbalanced results especially as regards the publication of 
sensitive information, which includes criminal convictions and political opinion, and the collection of 
information without notice direct from the data subject. This reality radically undermines European 
data protection’s twin purposes of ensuring the free flow of personal data and protecting 
fundamental rights, an outcome which remains largely unaddressed by the proposed new Data 
Protection Regulation. Practical suggestions are proposed to ameliorate these troubling 
inconsistencies within the current process of reform. 
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The European Union Data Protection regime centred on framework Directive 95/46/EC sets 
out the standards to “protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy with the respect to the processing of personal data” for all European 
Economic Area (EEA) Member States.1  Its default provisions impose very severe restrictions on the 
right to free speech, including what has traditionally been understood to constitute this right’s core, 
namely, the gathering, storing and imparting of information and ideas by the professional media 
(herein media expression).  However, as regards media expression, Member States are obliged to 
provide derogations from the substantive provisions but “only if they are necessary to reconcile the 
right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression”2 or, in other words, only if 
“necessary for the purpose of balance between fundamental rights”.3 It is separately stipulated that 
the level of data protection must be equivalent in all Member States.4 Even a casual examination of 
the realities, however, shows that these goals have not been achieved. This article sets out the first 
systematic study of formal statutory law on this issue across the EEA. 
As highlighted by the recent Court of Justice of the European (CJEU) decision on the data 
protection obligations of Google vis-à-vis its indexing of public domain content on the web,5 
European data protection has from its inception had a largely antagonistic relationship with freedom 
of expression. This is particularly true as regards media expression. On the one hand, the media is 
not only responsible for “the collection and storage of huge amounts of personal information in the 
form of interviews, government and company records, as well as photographs and films”6 but, at 
least within the private sector, it has been argued that “it is the media … which is capable of inflicting 
the gravest damage on the individual”7 as a result of personal information processing.  With the 
growth of ever more powerful processing capabilities, the potential to inflict severe, and sometimes 
unjustified, damage has only increased. At the same time, however, media entities not only play a 
key role within a democratic society, but data protection can constitute “a major obstacle to the 
production and publication of news and current affairs content”.8  
As already noted, these fundamental conflicts were not ignored during the drawing up of 
the EU Directive itself.  However, twenty years on, anecdotal evidence indicates that the equivalent 
and balanced regime envisaged by this instrument has been far from achieved. Even the European 
Commission’s Evaluation of the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive published in 2012 
noted that the Directive’s stipulations in this regard are “applied quite differently in the Member 
States”.9 
                                                          
1 Directive 95/46, art 1. 
2 Directive 95/46, art 9. 
3 Directive 95/46, recital 37. 
4 Directive, recital 8. 
5 C-131/12 Google Spain; Google v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 
EU:C:2014:317. 
6 P Keller, European and international media law: liberal democracy, trade and the new media (Oxford 
University Press 2011), 331. 
7 Great Britain, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, 20th Report: Protection of 
Personal Data (HMSO 1993), 39. 
8 Keller (n 6) p. 337. 
9 See Annex 2 of European Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment (SEC (2012) 72 FINAL) 13. 
These remarks were grounded in analysis produced in 2010 which, whilst interesting, was entirely qualitative, 
somewhat anecdotal and based only on an explicit examination of the laws in those States which joined the EU 
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This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of this pressing issue. It is based on an 
original data set which has collated, logically ordered and numerically coded outcomes found within 
the data protection law of each European Economic Area (EEA) jurisdiction.  Following an 
introductory section which outlines the pan-European structure of data protection including vis-à-vis 
media expression, this methodology is outlined in section two.  Section three then explores the 
comparative structure of media derogations within all EEA states, noting that whilst some have 
adopted discrete approaches to each substantive data protection provision, many others have 
adopted an identically worded derogation applicable to all or some of data protection’s default 
substance.  The particular derogations adopted within these latter cases are elucidated.  Sections 
four to seven then provides a detailed analysis of the media derogations applicable to each of the 
core substantive elements of the European data protection regime.  These results are integrated in 
section eight.   Finally, section nine sets out the article’s conclusions, together with some preliminary 
thoughts on the future shape of this legal framework. 
It is found that, notwithstanding the binding nature of the requirements in both the 
Directive and human rights instruments such as the EU Charter, many Member States have failed to 
provide for an effective balance within their statutory law.  Instead, countries in Northern European 
have tended to prioritize media freedom within their legal frameworks, whilst those in Eastern 
European and Latin counties have done likewise for data protection.  Given that the Directive is 
predicated on ensuring data protection equivalency as a quid pro quo for also requiring that the free 
flow of personal data between Member States neither be prohibited nor restricted,10 this reality 
poses a clear threat to the internal integrity of the pan-EU framework.  Even more critically, it also 
undermines the effective and certain legal protection of fundamental human rights in Europe.  
Unfortunately, despite the push from 2012 onwards to replace the Directive with a new General 
Data Protection Regulation, there is little evidence that the proposals made to date will directly 
address the serious problems elucidated here.  However, unless they do so, European data 
protection will likely remain fundamentally off balance. 
 
I.  THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE AND MEDIA EXPRESSION 
A.  The Default EU Data Protection Scheme 
 The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC binds the 28 full members of the EU along with 
three associated countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway)11 which taken together make up the 
EEA. It has a “breathtaking”12 scope. As regards the private sector data “controllers”, it applies to 
                                                          
before 2003. See D Korff, Data Protection Laws in the EU: The Difficulties in Meeting the Challenges posed by 
Global Social and Technical Developments (2010), 13-21 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_working_pa
per_2_en.pdf>. 
10 Directive 95/46, art 1.2; recital 8. 
11 The application of the Directive here is based on the Agreement on the European Economic Area (OJ 1994 L 
1). The precise relationship between the legal duties of these jurisdictions and both related legal provisions 
such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and interpretations of the law by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union remains a matter of great complexity, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
12 D. Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive (Butterworths 1996), 15. 
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any “processing” of “personal data” carried out either “wholly or partly by automatic means”13 or as 
part of a cognate manual filing system “structured according to specific criteria relating to 
individuals so as to permit easy access to the personal data in question”.14  Notwithstanding its 
technical and abstruse nomenclature, “personal data” actually encompasses “any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)”.15 Thus, “data” and 
“information” are treated synonymously and their conceptualization is wide enough to cover even 
innocuous details about an individual, such as a person’s job title, irrespective of whether this is 
already in the public domain.16 “Processing” encompasses “any operation or set of operations which 
is performed upon personal data … such as collection, recording, organisation, organisation, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”.17  Finally, 
“controller” is defined as the natural or legal person which “alone or jointly with others determines 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”.18 
 Controllers are generally obliged to ensure that any particular instance of data processing 
complies with the four core substantive elements of the EU Data Protection system which together 
include some eighteen different data protection provisions. In sum, these are structured as follows: 
• The Data Quality Principles (Provisions (i)-(v)): Five broadly applicable and generally open-
textured provisions setting out the default standards for good information handling 
including fairness, non-excessiveness and accuracy. 
• Transparency Rules (Provisions (vi)-(viii): Three rules setting out requirements for ensuring 
transparency of processing for the data subject, namely, (vi) requirements to proactively 
provide information to the data subject when data is being collected directly from him 
(proactive direct transparency rule), (vii) similar duties in certain circumstances to 
proactively provide information to data subject even when data is being collected indirectly 
via a third party or the public domain (proactive indirect transparency rule) and (viii) 
requirements to provide much more extensive information to the data subject on request 
(retroactive transparency rule). 
• Sensitive Data Rules (Provisions (ix)-(xv)): Special rules for ensuring that that data deemed 
sensitive generally cannot be processed by the private sector unless such a prohibition is 
waived in some way by the data subject. Rules apply to seven broad categories of data 
revealing, concerning or relating to information as to (ix) racial or ethnic origin, (x) political 
opinions, (xi) religious or philosophical beliefs, (xii) trade union membership, (xiii) health, 
(xiv) sex life and (xv) offences, criminal convictions and security measures. 
• Control Conditions (Provisions (xvi)-(xviii)): Three conditions which impose additional 
substantive restrictions on the processing of data for a controller’s own purposes but 
primarily have the function of ensuring that the other elements of the scheme are not 
undermined. These provisions stipulate (xvi) the need for a pre-specified legitimating ground 
                                                          
13 Directive 95/46, art 3. 
14 Directive 95/46, recital 15. 
15 Directive 95/46, art 2 (a). 
16 C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596; C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v 
Satakunnon Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, EU:C:2008:727. 
17 Directive 95/46, art 2 (b). 
18 Directive 95/46, art 2 (d). 
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for processing, (xvii) the requirements to provide a notification of data processing and (xviii) 
the need to restrict the export of data to countries lacking an adequate level of protection 
for such data.19 
Member States retain a certain “margin for manoeuvre” regarding how the Directive, including 
these default elements, are to be transposed.20 The particular law or laws which a controller must 
follow will generally depend upon which EEA country or countries he is established in and in the 
context of which establishment or establishments processing takes place.21 
 
B. EU Data Protection and Media Expression 
 Although its boundaries are contestable, there is a consensus that the concept of media 
expression refers at least to the publication of journalistic material by the professional press 
together with those audiovisual entities which disseminate news periodically.   All the four core 
substantive elements of EU Data Protection have the potential to exert a significant impact on such 
expression.  Thus, although the data quality principles often enunciate standards which are “in the 
best traditions of good responsible journalism”,22 they nevertheless have a particularly wide scope 
and give the full force of law to provisions which have traditionally been seen as a matter of self-
regulation only.  If the proactive direct transparency rule is applied then, when collecting personal 
data from the data subject, “no undercover investigation by journalists will lawfully be possible”23 
even in relation to a story of great public importance and even when the data will be anonymised 
before publication. Meanwhile, the proactive indirect transparency rule would impose a duty of data 
subject notification when information is collected from third parties more onerous than that 
rejected as being required under the European Convention on Human Rights,24 whilst that relating 
to retroactive transparency would require an even greater openness vis-à-vis media activity, thereby 
threatening both media autonomy and journalistic source confidentiality.25 As regards the broad 
categories of data they regulate, the sensitive data rules would generally prohibit publication if the 
data subject objects. Given that processing of specially protected categories of information such as 
criminal conviction and political opinion lie at the heart of much media output, application of these 
                                                          
19 It might be thought that the data security provisions in articles 16 and 17 of Directive 95/46 should also be 
included in this category.  However, as the European Commission’s Amended Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
such Data Explanatory Memorandum (COM (92) 422 final) emphasised (at 37), these provisions were designed 
to be procedural as opposed to substantive since they are aimed only at ensuring that information is not 
subject to unauthorized processing, especially by third parties.  This procedural understanding was confirmed 
by the CJEU in Satamedia (2008) at [64]. 
20 Directive 95/46, recital 9. 
21 Directive 95/46, art 4. If the controller is not established in any EEA state but makes use of equipment on the 
territory of one or more Member State, then he must comply with national laws in each country or countries. 
22 Council of Europe, Legislation and Data Protection: Proceedings of the Rome Conference on problems 
relating to the development and application of legislation on data protection (Camera dei Deputati 1983), 72. 
23 S Rasaiah & D Newell, ‘Data Protection and Press Freedom’ (1997/98) 3 Yearbook of Media and 
Entertainment Law 232. 
24 Mosley v United Kingdom (48009/08) [2012] EMLR 1. 
25 Rasaiah & Newell (n 23), 234-236. 
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provisions would “radically restrict the freedom of the press”.26 Finally, whilst not so directly 
burdensome, the control provisions would nevertheless tie the media to formalized rules on data 
processing which, whilst perhaps common within other industries, would generally be seen as alien 
and intrusive by many within the journalistic sector. 
In recognition of the need to establish an appropriate equilibrium between data protection 
and other fundamental values, the Directive did allow EEA Member States to provide certain 
derogations from these default positions. As previously stated, in relation to media expression, 
article 9 of the Directive states that Member States must provide derogations from any part of the 
substantive provisions of the Directive but “only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to 
privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression”.27  Recital 37 of the Directive further 
stressed that the derogations adopted should be those “necessary for the purpose of balance 
between fundamental rights”, whilst recital 8 more generally set out the overarching requirement 
that the level of data protection “must be equivalent in all Member States”. In Satamedia (2008), the 
Court of Justice of the European Union addressed the interaction between journalistic expression 
and the data protection regime finding that “in order to achieve a balance between the two 
fundamental rights, the protection of the fundamental right to privacy requires that the derogations 
and limitations in relation to the protection of data … must apply only is so far as is strictly 
necessary”.28   The binding nature of this requirement to reconcile conflict fundamental rights has 
been strengthened by the inclusion of rights to privacy and data protection together with a right to 
freedom of expression29 within the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  According to Article 52 of this 
instrument, any limitations on rights must respect its “essence”, comply with the principle of 
proportionality, be necessary and “genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”.  Although neither the European 
Convention on Human Rights nor many national constitutions explicitly include a right to data 
protection itself,30 it is clear these instruments do recognise both a right to freedom of expression 
and a right to privacy, similarly mandating that any legislative restriction on these rights be justified 
according to the same kind of proportionality principles.31  In light of the binding nature of these 
requirements, it is important to explore to what extent national transposing laws do effectively 
balance or reconcile these conflicting rights. 
 
                                                          
26 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1373, [2003] QB 
633 at [123]. 
27 Directive 95/46, art 9 
28 Satamedia, above note 16 at [56]. 
29 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 2010 C 83, p. 389), arts 7, 8 and 11.  
30 Although the European Convention on Human Rights excludes mention of this, some thirteen EU member 
states do include a right to data protection in their Constitution.  See J Cannataci and J Misfud-Bonnici, ʻData 
Protection Comes of Age:  The Data Protection Clauses in the European Constitutional Treatyʼ (2005) 14 
Information and Communications Technology Law 8. 
31 See, as regards the European Convention on Human Rights, art 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) 
and art 10 (freedom of expression). 
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II.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
A. Overview 
This article seeks to systematically explore the different extents to which the national 
transposition of the Data Protection Directive in each Member State jurisdiction makes allowance 
for media expression both as a whole and also as regards particular aspects of the law.  Such a task is 
best approached through a formal quantitative coding of the law.   Although such a methodology 
would have been considered highly unusual only a decade ago, there is now a growing consensus 
that such “numerical comparative law can contribute to many core topics of comparative law”32 
including the study of regulation33 and comparative human rights.34  The specific standardized 
coding the article maps the strength in each jurisdiction of any and all derogations applicable to the 
media vis-à-vis the EU data protection scheme.  The structure of Article 9 of the Directive itself aids 
this goal since, at the level of each individual data protection provision, it clearly provides for two 
outlying positions.  On the one hand, a Member State may choose to provide no derogation at all 
from the provision, such that it remains 100 percent applicable.  On the other, an absolute 
derogation may be provided whereby that the data protection provision in question is completely 
eliminated.  In between these extremes, a wide variety of intermediary positions are also possible.   
An inductive examination was made of any and all derogations applicable to media 
expression set out in the Data Protection Acts currently in force within all EEA Member State 
jurisdictions or, in other words, all 31 EEA Member States together with the special case of Gibraltar, 
a separate jurisdiction within the EU but one for which the UK Government remains responsible.35  
In most cases, reliance was placed on the English language versions of the legislation made available 
by the Data Protection Authority or other official government agency.  However, in any case where 
the translation appeared to be potentially inaccurate or it was clear that relevant materials were 
unavailable in this format, a check was made with the original language version of the law.  Based on 
this inductive analysis, the observed derogation outcomes were grouped at the individual data 
protection provision level into seven categories labelled (a) to (g) which were standardized so as to 
be identically defined not only between the different jurisdictions but also between the different 
provisions themselves.  These derogation categories were ordered from high to low according to 
whether, and if so to what extent, data protection was still applicable in the media sphere.  Given 
that the extreme categories here unequivocally represented respectively complete (1) substantive 
applicability of ordinary data protection provisions to the media and no (0) applicability, these 
categories were converted onto a notional 0, 1 scale such that (a) = 1, (b) = 0.83, (c) = 0.67, (d) = 0.5, 
(e) = 0.33, (f) = 0.17, (g) = 0.  This assignment allowed for Member States to be allocated a score in 
relation to each individual data protection provision.  Relevant scores were then combined in order 
to provide an overall measure of the continued relevance of each of the four substantive elements 
of EU data protection outlined above.  Finally, these element level scores were combined to provide 
an overall representation of data protection in the media sphere.   Whilst neither the overall nor 
                                                          
32 M Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014), 186. 
33 See, for example, Siems, Mathias, ʻRegulatory Competition in Partnership Lawʼ (2009) 58 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. 
34 See, for example, T Ginsburg, D Lansberg-Rodriguez and N Versteeg, ʻWhen to Overthrow your Government:  
The Right to Resist in the World’s Constitutionsʼ (2013) 60 UCLA Law Review. 
35 See art 355 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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necessarily even the element level results map precisely to the seven standardized categories 
defined at individual provision level, the use of a standardized scale still enables these scores to 
represent the extent to which substantive data protection remains applicable vis-à-vis media 
expression both as regards the regime as a whole and as regards particular elements of it.  Thus, an 
advantage of the micro-foundational approach adopted is that it allows for comparison of data 
protection outcomes at every level from the most general, right down to that of individual 
provisions.36 
 
B.  Ordered Categories and the Standardized Scale 
 The seven categories, ordered from complete to no applicability of data protection and with 
values ranging from 1 to 0, are listed and defined in Table One below. 
 
Table One:  Ordered Categories Measuring the Extent of Continued Applicability of European Data 
Protection vis-à-vis Media Expression 
Category & 
Scale Point 
Summary  Precise Definition (with Examples in Italics) 
(a) / 1 No 
derogation 
No derogation provided at all from the default general minimum set out in the 
Directive. 
 
(b) / 0.83 Minimal 
derogation 
Either (i) no media exemption set out but only a special interpretative provision 
which provided a gloss but did not supplant the particular data protection 
provision in question or (ii) an exemption is provided but this is limited to a 
narrow aspect of the provision in question. 
 
Examples:  As regards (i), Italian law does not exempt the media from compliance with the data quality 
principles but certain legal provisions including a specially drafted Code of Practice do set out special 
interpretative provisions in the media’s favour.37  As regards (ii), Romanian law requires the media to comply 
with the general rules as regards ensuring retroactive transparency of data processing on request from the 
data subject except in so far as the confidentiality of journalistic sources would be affected.38 
(c) / 0.67 Rule 
Restricted 
Exemption 
A wide-ranging media exemption is provided from the particular provision in 
question so long as the processing falls within specific pre-defined 
circumstances and/or complies with specific pre-determined rules. 
 
Example:  Luxembourg law provides a media exemption from the general requirement to retroactively disclose 
information to the data subject but only if media entity allow for access instead through “the intermediary of 
the Commissioner Nationale pour la Protection des Donneess in the presence of the Conseil de Presse or his 
representative, or the Chairman of the Conseil de Presse duly called upon”.39 
                                                          
36 A study is in progress examining how data protection legislation has actually been applied via-à-vis the 
media in each EEA jurisdiction.  The standardized approach adopted here should aid systematic comparison 
between these two datasets. 
37 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, sec 163.3; Italy, Code of Practice Concerning the Processing of Personal 
Data in the Exercise of Journalistic Activities. 
38 Romania, Law No. 677/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and the Free Movement of Such Data (as amended), art 13.6. 
39 Luxembourg, Coordinated Text of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data (as modified), sec 29 (3). 
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(d) / 0.5 Strict Public 
Interest 
Exemption 
An overarching media exemption is provided but this is subject to compliance 
with a test which, whilst open-textured, is based on a strictly objective analysis 
of where the public interest lies. 
 
Example:  Bulgarian law provides the media with an exemption from certain data protection provisions but 
only “to the extent to which it does not violate the right to privacy of the person to whom such data relate”.40 
(e) / 0.33 Permissive 
Public 
Interest 
Exemption 
An overarching media exemption is provided but this requires compliance with 
an open-textured public interest test which, whilst imposing significant duties 
on the media, is phrased so as to be more permissive than a strictly objective 
test would be. 
 
Example:   United Kingdom law exempts media entities from compliance with a range substantive data 
protection provisions so long as the media entity “reasonably believes that, having regard in particular to the 
special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression, publication would be in the public interest” 
and that it also “reasonably believes that, in all the circumstances, compliance is incompatible” with this 
purpose.41 
(f) / 0.17 Minimal 
Inclusion 
Either (i) data protection law excludes much of media data processing 
unconditionally from the provision in question but subjects some other types of 
media expression data processing to it only to a limited extent or (ii) an 
overarching exemption is provided for the media subject only to compliance 
with a test of minimal substantive content. 
 
Examples:  As regards (i), Dutch law provides the media with a complete exemption from all of the sensitive 
data rules element, subject only to the requirement that the processing is “necessary” for journalistic 
purposes.42  As regards (ii), in Germany the media is generally entirely exempted from the fourth data quality 
principle which requires that data be accurate and, where necessary, up-to-date (provision iv).43   
Nevertheless, under the federal Data Protection Act, if reporting by Deutsche Welle (the German equivalent of 
the BBC World Service) “infringes the privacy of an individual”,44 a person may make a request to that any 
“inaccurate data be corrected”.    Similarly, the German Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia 
establishes that, as regards other broadcasters, if a person is “negatively affected in his interests meriting 
protection” by inaccurate journalistic processing, he may demand either its “correction” or the addition of his 
“own statement of appropriate length”.45 
(g) /0 Complete 
Exclusion 
An absolute and unconditional media expression derogation is provided from 
the particular data protection provision in question. 
 
III. COMPARATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE MEDIA DEROGATIONS 
A. Specific or Generally Applicable Derogations 
 The law of a number of jurisdictions sets out a multiplicity of specific derogations in favour 
of the media based on divergent tests which are then made applicable to different aspects of the 
data protection regime.  In these cases, it is appropriate to analyse the nature of these tests during 
discussion of relevant data protection provision in question.  In a significant number of other 
jurisdictions, however, an identically worded clause is made applicable to all, or at least most, of the 
substantive data protection provisions from which a derogation is provided.  In these cases, it makes 
sense to analyse the clause at the outset and then cross-refer to this during the subsequent specific 
                                                          
40 Bulgaria, Law for the Protection of Personal Data, art 5 (7). 
41 United Kingdom, Data Protection Act 1998, sec 32 (1) (emphasis added). 
42 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1). 
43 Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(d). 
44 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG), sec 41 (3).  For completeness it should be noted that it is also 
stated that if Deutsche Welle’s journalistic processing “leads to the publication of counter-statements by the 
data subject, these counter-statements shall be added to the recorded data and retained for the same length 
of time as the data themselves” (sec 41 (2)). 
45 Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia 2010, art 47 (2). 
10 
 
discussion.  These cross-references will be designated by the placing of an asterisk (*) next to the 
name of the country concerned.  The generally applicable derogations are principally outlined 
immediately below.   However, in two jurisdictions (Estonia and Malta), the wording of this clause 
renders unclear which data protection provisions it seeks to modify or even eliminate.  These cases 
will, therefore, be separately addressed in sub-section B below.  
 Three jurisdictions (*Finland,46 *Norway47 and *Sweden48) exempt the media completely 
and unconditionally from all the substantive data protection provisions.  Austrian and the Icelandic 
law generally provides likewise, except in relation to all (*Austria49) or some (*Iceland50) of the data 
quality principles.  *Lithuanian law also sets out an absolute and unconditional exemption but 
restricts this its ambit to the transparency rules (provisions (vi)-(viii)), the notification of processing 
rule (provision xvii) and data export condition (provision (xviii)).51  All these countries are coded into 
category g/0 in relation to the provisions controlled by these clauses.   
The laws of a large number of jurisdictions (*Gibraltar, *France, *Ireland, *Latvia, *Poland 
and the *United Kingdom) set out a broadly applicable permissive derogation based on the public 
interest which, therefore, falls within category e/0.33 of our ordered scale.  French law sets out 
professional journalistic derogation from provision (iv) of the data principles element, the 
transparency rules element (provisions (vi)-(viii)), the sensitive data element (provisions (ix)-(xv)) and 
the data export condition (provision (xviii)) so long as processing is “according to the ethical rules of 
this profession”.52  Polish law exempts the media from compliance with all the substantive data 
provisions except where “the freedom of information and dissemination considerably violates the 
rights and freedoms of the data subject”.53  Gibraltan, Irish and UK law set out a derogation which is 
available so long as 
(a) the processing is undertaken [solely] with a view to the publication of any journalistic, 
literary or artistic material, (b) the data controller reasonably believes that, having regard in 
particular to the special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression, [such] 
publication would be in the public interest, and (c) the data controller reasonably believes 
that, in all the circumstances compliance with that provision would be incompatible with 
inter alia journalistic purposes.54 
This derogation is applied in all cases to the data quality principles (provisions (i)-(v)), transparency 
rules (provisions (vi)-(viii)) and sensitive personal data rules (provisions (ix)-(xv)), the legitimating 
ground condition (provision (xvi)) and, in the Gibraltan and UK case only, also the data export 
condition (provisions (xviii)).  Gibraltan law also applies this derogation to the requirement to 
provide a notification of data processing (provision (xvii)), whilst Irish law exempts the media 
                                                          
46 Finland, Personal Data Act, sec 2 (5). 
47 Norway, Personal Data Act, sec 7. 
48 Sweden, Personal Data Act, sec 7. 
49 Austria, Federal Act Concerning the Protection of Personal Data (DSG), sec 48. 
50 Iceland, Act on the Protection of Privacy as regards the Processing of Personal Data, art 5. 
51 Lithuania, Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data, art 8. 
52 France, Law on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties, art 67. 
53 Poland, Act on the Protection of Personal Data 1997 (as amended), art 3.a.2. 
54 Gibraltar, Data Protection Act 2004, s. 13; Ireland Data Protection Act, sec 22A; UK, Data Protection Act 
1998, sec 32.  The parts added in square brackets reflect additions inserted into the Gibraltan and Irish 
legislation only. 
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unconditionally from this requirement.  Latvia sets out a full media exemption from proactive 
transparency rules (provisions (vi) and (vii)), all but the last provision in the sensitive personal data 
element (provisions (ix)-(xiv)) and the legitimating ground requirement (provision xvi) but states that 
in applying this “the rights of persons to the inviolability of private life and freedom of expression 
shall be observed”.55  A different exemption is provided from the requirement to provide a 
notification of data processing (provision xvii) which will be analysed separately below. 
One country, *Bulgaria, sets out a broadly applicable derogation which because of its 
incorporation of a clearly objective, public interest test is placed within category d/0.5.  More 
specifically, the law here provides a media data processing exemption from the proactive aspects of 
the transparency rules (provisions (vi)-(viii)), the sensitive data rules (provisions (ix)-(xv)) and the 
control conditions (provisions (xvi)-(xviii)) “to the extent to which such processing does not violate 
the right to privacy of the person to whom the data relate”.56    
The laws of three countries (*Croatia, *Czech Republic and *Spain) provide no media 
derogation at all from any part of the data protection scheme.  All these countries are therefore 
placed in category a/1 in relation to each data protection provision.  *Hungary is coded similarly on 
all the data protection provisions except the proactive transparency rule when collecting 
information directly from the data subject (provision (vi)) where a derogation is provided as outlined 
below. 
 
B.  Malta and Estonia:  Derogations of Unclear Scope and Meaning 
 In almost all cases, it is easy determine which data protection provisions any media 
derogation applies to.  Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, this is made explicit.  However, in two 
cases (*Estonia and *Malta), this is far from the case.   Section 11 (2) of the Estonian Personal Data 
Protection Act provides that: 
Personal data may be processed and disclosed in the media for journalistic purposes without 
the consent of the data subject, if there is predominant public interest therefore and this is 
in accordance with the principles of journalism ethics.  Disclosure of information shall not 
cause excessive damage to the rights of the data subject. 
To the extent that this provides for a qualified exemption from data protection provisions, it is 
reasonably clear that this clause imposes a strict public interest test based on judicial consideration 
of the “predominant” interest and therefore should be placed in category d/0.5.  However, save 
from providing that consent is not required in these cases, the clause does not explicitly set out from 
which data protection provisions a qualified exemption may be provided.  Matters are made even 
more complex by the fact that Estonia has transposed the requirements of the Directive in a highly 
idiosyncratic way.  A close analysis of the Estonian data protection regime indicates the way it has 
                                                          
55 Latvia, Data Protection Act, art 5.  This article further states that those processing for journalistic purposes 
must act in accordance with the Law on Press and Other Mass Media.  However, analysis of this non-data 
protection specific media regulation is outside the scope of this article. 
56 Bulgaria, Law for the Protection of Personal Data, art 4 (2); art 5 (7); art 36a(7). 
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implemented the sensitive personal data rules (provisions (ix)-(xv))57 and the proactive transparency 
rule when collecting information directly the data subject (provision (vi))58 depends on a 
presumption that consent will be obtained in these cases.  A similar presumption applies in Estonian 
law in relation to the need for a legitimating ground for processing (provision (xvi)).59  Meanwhile, 
whilst no similar presumption applies in relation other transparency rules (provisions (vii)-(viii)), in 
these cases the Act does allow for a restriction where otherwise this may “damage rights and 
freedoms of other persons”.60  This also establishes a similar strict, public interest test to that 
detailed above.  Therefore, in relation to all of these provisions, Estonian law is coded into category 
c/0.5.  In contrast, as will be seen, compliance with the default data quality principles (provisions (i)-
(v)), the data export condition (provision (xviii)) and the notification of processing condition 
(provision (xvii)) does not intrinsically depend on obtaining the consent of the data subject and nor is 
any other derogation set out.  Therefore, in these cases Estonian law is coded into category a/1. 
 The nature of the media derogation within the Maltese Data Protection Act presents even 
more challenging interpretative difficulties.  Sections 6 (1)-(3) of this Act states that: 
(1)  Subject to the following provisions of this article, nothing in this Act shall prejudice the 
application of the European Convention Act relating to freedom of expression, or the 
provisions of the Press Act relating to journalistic freedoms. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subarticle (1) the [Data Protection] Commissioner 
shall encourage the drawing up of a suitable code of conduct to be applicable to 
journalists and to the media to regulate the processing of any personal data and the 
code of conduct shall provide appropriate measure and procedures to protect the data 
subject, having regard to the nature of the data. 
(3) In the absence of such a code of conduct, the Commissioner may establish specific 
measures and procedures to protect the data subjects; in such a case journalists and the 
media are to comply with measures and procedures so established. 
The language in s. 6(1) stating that, apart from s. 6 itself, the data protection scheme shall not 
“prejudice” either the Press Act or the European Convention Act is clearly strong since, following the 
definition of this provided in the Oxford English Dictionary, it could imply that the provisions should 
not even “bias” the application of these provisions.  Whilst most of the provisions of the Maltese 
Press Act do not directly conflict with data protection legislation,61 the First Schedule of the 
European Convention Act does repeat verbatim the wording of Article 10 (1) in the European 
Convention which establishes a broad right to freedom of expression, including the imparting and 
receipt of information without interference by public authority, which is in clear tension with data 
protection requirements.  On the other hand, Article 10 (2)’s specific validation of permissible 
interferences with this right in order to safeguard the rights of others (which in principle could 
include their data protection rights), further complicates the picture.  Moreover, the rest of s. 6 
                                                          
57 Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, sec 12 (4). 
58 Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, sec 12 (3). 
59 Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, sec 14 (1). 
60 Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, sec 20 (1) (1); sec 15 (2) (5). 
61 Sec 46 of the Maltese Press Act does place certain limits on the disclosure of journalistic sources as a result 
of legal processes.  This could be seen to be in direct tension with the requirement to disclose information to 
data subjects on request.  This is an aspect of the transparency provisions dealt within the next section. 
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demonstrates a clear intention not to exclude media activity absolutely and unconditionally from the 
data protection regime.   To date, however, no code of conduct nor formal measures and procedures 
have yet been drawn up, although the Data Protection Commissioner has produced general 
guidance on street photography62 and more generally acknowledged that in the absence of a code 
he does have an obligation to specific measures and procedures.63  Overall, it seems that the 
purpose of the scheme set out in section 6 was to establish a general expectation that ordinary data 
protection provisions would not be applicable to media expression so long as certain minimum 
standards were complied with.  Given this, it is most appropriate to place Maltese law within 
category e/0.33 in relation to all the substantive data protection provisions. 
 
IV.  MEDIA EXPRESSION AND THE DATA QUALITY PRINCIPLES (PROVISIONS (i)-(v)) 
 The five data quality principles are set out in article 6 of the Directive and provide that 
personal data must be: 
i. processed fairly and lawfully, 
ii. collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes, 
iii. adequate, relevant and not excessive, 
iv. accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, 
v. kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary. 
With three exceptions discussed below, Member State law has adopted an identical approach as 
regards the availability of media derogations in relation to all of the above principles.  The law of 
some eighteen jurisdictions (Belgium, *Bulgaria, *Croatia, Cyprus, *Czech Republic, *Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, *Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
*Slovakia, Slovenia and *Spain) apply the principles without restriction to the media and, therefore 
fall within category a/1.  Italian law falls within category b/0.83 since it applies the principles to the 
media but set out a special interpretative provisions in its favour. Thus, section 136.3 of the Personal 
Data Protection Code provides when data are communicated or disseminated in the exercise and for 
the sole purpose of the journalistic profession 
the limitations imposed on freedom of the press to protect the rights [instantiated in the data 
protection regime] … in particular, concerning the materiality of the information with regard to 
facts of public interest, shall be left unprejudiced.  It shall be allowed to process the data 
concerning circumstances or events that have been made known either directly by the data 
subject or on account of the latter’s public conduct. 
On the other hand, the media are not exempted from the data quality principles and are additionally 
subject to a legally binding Code of Practice Concerning the Processing of Personal Data in the 
                                                          
62 Malta, Data Protection Commissioner, Data Protection and Street Photography [2013] 
<http://idpc.gov.mt/dbfile.aspx/Data_Prot_and_Street_Photography.pdf>. 
63 Malta, Data Protection Commissioner, Annual Report 2005, 6 
<http://idpc.gov.mt/dbfile.aspx/Annual%20Report%202005.pdf>. 
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Exercise of Journalistic Activities (Data Protection Journalism Code)64  which reiterates in a modified 
form many of the data quality principles.65  No EEA state has adopted a derogation here in the form 
of either category c/0.67 or category d/0.5.  The law of six jurisdictions (Austria, *Gibraltar, *Ireland, 
*Poland, *Malta and the *UK) set out a more permissive public interest derogation here which, 
therefore, falls within category e/0.33.  In Austria, whilst media expression is presumptively subject 
to compliance with the data quality principles66 the Act also then states that media use of data for 
journalistic purposes “shall be legal insofar as this is required to fulfil the information requirements 
of the media companies, media services and their operatives in the exercise of their right to free 
speech pursuant to art. 10 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights”.67  Especially given 
the lack of direct mention of permissible interferences with freedom of expression under article 10 
(2) of the Convention, this wording effectively grants the media considerable leeway before the law 
imposes substantive data protection requirements on them through recourse to the data quality 
principles.   In excluding much media processing unconditionally from the data protection principles 
but subjecting other types of processing to certain limited elements, one jurisdiction (Denmark) falls 
within category f/0.17.  Here, general data protection law grants journalistic expression an absolute 
exemption from all the substantive data protection provisions it sets out.68  However, a sector-
specific piece of data protection legislation, the Law on Mass Media Information Databases 
establishes that publicly available mass media electronic information databases “may not hold 
information that cannot be legally published in the mass media”,69 that they must delete, correct or 
update information which is “false or misleading”70 and that they also “may not hold information 
whose disclosure would be contrary to the ethics of journalism”.71   The first requirement 
instantiates the lawfulness aspect of provision (i) whilst the second aspect includes elements of 
provision (iii).  Meanwhile, the last invocation of journalistic ethics overlaps at least to an extent with 
most of the data quality principles, albeit with a heavy emphasis on media self-regulation.72   
However, rather undercutting these protections, databases used internally by the mass media are 
excluded these requirements.73  Meanwhile, whilst publicly available information databases are 
                                                          
64 This Code was issued by the Italian Data Protection Authority in 1998 following discussion with the media.  
Its legally binding status is governing by sec 139 and sec 12 of the Italian Personal Data Protection Code. 
65 The Code’s provisions reiterating the need to rectify inaccurate data (art. 4) and that journalists may keep 
data as long as is necessary for the relevant professional purposes (art. 2.4) clearly map on to principles three 
and five.  Other key provisions include those relating the collection of data, protection of human dignity and 
non-discrimination (all relevant to principle one) and the need to actively assess the materiality or otherwise 
of information (relevant to principle one and three). 
66 Austria, Federal Act Concerning the Protection of Personal Data (DSG), s. 48 (1). 
67 Ibid, s. 48 (2). 
68 Danish, Act on the Processing of Personal Data 2000 (as amended), s. 2. 
69 Denmark, Lov om massemediers informationsdatabaser 1994, sec 3 (8) (translated from Danish). 
70 Ibid, sec 3 (9) (this section also states that such a requirement applies when a previously mentioned 
judgment has been modified, the prosecution in a previously mentioned case has been abandoned or when a 
prosecution results in acquittal.  These additions appear to be further specifications of when continued 
information dissemination would be “misleading” (vildledende). 
71 Ibid, sec 3 (8) (translation from Danish). 
72 See Danish Press Council, Sound Press Ethics (n.d.) (http://www.pressenaevnet.dk/Information-in-
English/The-Press-Ethical-Rules.aspx) (accessed 25/11/14). 
73 The only relevant stipulations placed on such databases is that if they are electronic in nature then they can 
only be “made available to anyone other than mass media journalists and editorial staff” who further “should 
not access or use the information database for anything other than journalistic or editorial work” (sec 2 (4)).  
These provisions can be seen as a very partial instantiation of the second data quality principle. 
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defined as databases made publicly available by the mass media “which make use of electronic data 
processing in connection with the dissemination of news and other information”,74  the Act also fully 
excludes databases which only include already published text, images, periodicals, audio or video 
programs so long as the information database has been unchanged in relation to the original 
publication.  These fall instead within the Danish Media Liability Act.75  The law of three countries 
(*Finland, *Norway and *Sweden) exclude the media entirely from the principles and, therefore, fall 
within category g/0. 
 Turning to the three exceptional cases, *French law provides no derogation at all in relation 
to the principles (i)-(iv) and, therefore, falls within category a/1 here.  In relation to principle (v), 
however, a coding of e/0.33 is recorded since an exemption is available so long as processing is 
“according to the ethical rules of this [the journalistic] profession”.76 Meanwhile, the clause in the 
Icelandic Act relating to the media provides it with a full exemption from principles (ii), (iii) and (v), 
thereby placing it within category g/0 here.   This clause additionally states that principles (i) and (iv) 
“shall apply” 77  whilst also stating that “[t]o the extent necessary to reconcile the right to privacy on 
the one hand and freedom of expression on the other, derogations can be made from provisions in 
the Act in the interest of journalism, art or literature”.78   Taken together, this wording appears to 
establish a strict or fully objective public interest balancing test as regards these two provisions; a 
coding of d/0.5 is, therefore, recorded.   Finally, German law generally exempts the media from 
compliance with all the substantive data protection provisions.79  However, some entities, namely 
Deutche Welle (the German equivalent of the BBC World Service) and other broadcasters regulated 
under the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, are subject to a very partial extent to 
certain aspects of data protection including a qualified version of principle (iv).   Under the German 
federal Data Protection Act, if reporting by Deutsche Welle “infringes the privacy of an individual” 
this person “may request that inaccurate data be corrected”.80  Meanwhile, as regards other 
broadcasters, when in relation to inaccurate journalistic processing a person is “negatively affected 
in his interests meriting protection”, he may demand either its “correction” or the addition of his 
“own statement of appropriate length”.81  Given this, German law is coded as f/0.17 in relation to 
principle (iv) and g/0 in relation to the other principles.    The final scores for these three countries 
on the data quality principles element are 0.87 for France, 0.14 for Iceland and 0.03 for Germany.  
However, especially since these scores are so similar to categories (b), (f) and (g) respectively, it is 
                                                          
74 Ibid, sec 1 (2) (translated from Danish). 
75 Ibid, sec 1 (1).  It should be noted that, whilst not mandating the various other stipulations mentioned 
above, this Media Liability Act 1998 does repeat the same language that such content must be conformity with 
sound journalistic ethics.  See Denmark, Media Liability Act 1998 (as amended), sec 34 
<http://www.pressenaevnet.dk/Information-in-English/The-Media-Liability-Act.aspx>. 
76 France, Law on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties, art 67. 
77 Iceland, Act on the Protection of Privacy as Regards the Processing of Personal Data, art 5. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41 (1); Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and 
Telemedia, art 57 (1). 
80 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41 (3).  Sec 41 (2) also states that if Deutsche Welle’s journalistic 
processing “leads to the publication of counter-statements by the data subject, these counter-statements shall 
be added to the recorded data and retained for the same length of time as the data themselves”. 
81 Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia 2010, art 47 (2). 
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appropriate in relation to Chart One below which provides a summary of the results here to round 
these into the nearest applicable category. 
 
Chart One:  Media Expression and the Data Quality Principles 
 
 
V.  MEDIA EXPRESSION AND THE TRANSPARENCY RULES (PROVISIONS (vi)-(viii)) 
A. Proactive Transparency (provisions (vi)-(vii)) 
Whilst a general presumption of openness is seen as an intrinsic aspect of fairness under the 
data quality provision (i) considered above, 82 the Directive complements this by establishing a 
specific rules requiring data controllers to proactively provide data subjects with information as to 
their identity, the purposes of the processing and any further information necessary to guarantee 
fair processing in respect of the data subject.83  When information is collected directly from the data 
subject, a rule applies that this information must be provided at the time of collection in all 
circumstances.84  In contrast, as regards indirect collection of information (e.g. via a third party or 
from the public domain) the information should be provided “at the time of undertaking the 
recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is envisaged, no later than the time when 
the data are first disclosed”85 but not if this “would involve a disproportionate effort or disclosure is 
                                                          
82 Directive 95/46, recital 38. 
83 Directive 95/46, arts 10 and 11.  Many countries have transposed the language of the Directive directly in to 
their law.  Others however have specified certain sometimes wide-ranging categories of information which 
they consider must be provided to data subjects either in all or only certain circumstances.  Whilst clearly 
interesting, an analysis of this diversity is beyond the scope of this article. 
84 Directive 95/46, art 10. 
85 It might be thought that this rule only stipulates that the media must provide this information at the time of 
publication.  However, the Directive defines ‘third party’ broadly as any natural or legal person other than the 
data subject, the controller or somebody processing on behalf or operating under the direct authority of 
controller (arts 2 (e) and (f)).  According to Rasaiah and Newell (n 23) this means that “‘publication’ to the 
public is unlikely to be ‘first disclosure’.  Aside from sources checked in the course of compiling the report, this 
might have been from freelance journalists to news editor of the newspaper; staff journalists to freelance sub-
editor; photographer to newsagency; reporter to independent programme producer” (232). 
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expressly laid down by law” so long as “appropriate safeguards” are in place.86  This latter stipulation 
has been interpreted very differently by the Member States.  Some have required provision of 
information in all cases, others allow a reliance on impossibility or disproportionate effort only in 
limited circumstances or subject to sometimes onerous conditions, whilst a third group allow for 
such a reliance without the application of any further safeguards at all.87 
Turning to the approach of Member States to the application vis-à-vis the media of the 
proactive direct transparency rule when information is directly sourced from the data subject 
(provision (vi)), six jurisdictions (*Croatia, *Czech Republic, Romania, *Slovakia, Slovenia and *Spain) 
set out no media derogation and, therefore, fall within category a/1.  Hungarian law includes a 
minimal exemption from this provision which, therefore, falls within category b/0.83.  In sum, in 
situations where personally informing the data subject is either impossible or the cost is excessively 
high, this provision allows data controllers to choose instead to disclose to the world at large a wide 
range of information including the event of data collection, its scope, its purpose, the duration of its 
processing, possible controllers authorised to acquire knowledge of the data and information on the 
data subjects’ rights and legal redress opportunities.88  The laws of three jurisdictions (Greece, Italy 
and Liechtenstein) set out rule-bound exemptions which fall within category c/0.67.  Greek law 
declares that journalists can be exempted from this provision but only when their collection of 
information “refers to public figures”.89  In Italy, the Data Protection Journalism Code states that 
journalists “must identify themselves, their profession and the purposes of collection, unless this 
may endanger their safety or otherwise make it impossible for them to carry out their journalistic 
activity” but then further adds that “they must refrain from subterfuge and harassment”.90  In some 
tension with the wording of the Directive, Liechtenstein extends to all types of controller the 
possibility to claim an exemption if provision of the information to the data subject is either 
“impossible” or “would involve disproportionate efforts”.91  It is left unclear whether impossibility is 
confined to technical impossibility or extends to a wider notion which would allow the purpose of 
processing, such as a need to collect data covertly, being taken into account.  In any case, the idea of 
the effort of information provision being itself disproportionate does not obviously relate to 
situations where data is gathered through direct interaction with the data subject.  In two 
jurisdictions (*Bulgaria and *Estonia) an exemption is provided based on an objective, public interest 
test as defined by category d/0.5.  Eight jurisdictions (*France, *Gibraltar, *Ireland, *Latvia, 
Luxembourg, *Malta, *Poland and *UK) set out a more permissive public interest exemptions which, 
therefore, fall within category e/0.33.  Luxembourg law provides that the rule does not apply “if its 
                                                          
86 Ibid, art 11.2. The Directive also adds that such an exemption is not applicable where such information 
provision is impossible.  Since a number of Member States, perhaps incorrectly, treat this situation as a mere 
example of a disproportionate effort circumstance arising, it will generally not be analysed separately. 
87  Presumably on the, albeit rather tenuous, basis that compliance with the rest of the data protection scheme 
constitutes the “appropriate safeguards” required by this clause in the Directive. 
88 Hungary, Act CXII of 2011 on Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Information, sec 20 (4).  
Whilst traditional media activities are not explicitly excluded from this provision, it wording appears only to fit 
the, albeit probably only indirect collection of personal data, resulting from activities such as CCTV and 
perhaps street mapping services. 
89 Greece, Law 2472/1997 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (as 
amended), art 11.5. 
90 Italy, Data Protection Journalism Code, art 2.1. The complete prohibition on subterfuge (artifici) is 
particularly far-reaching. 
91 Liechtenstein, Data Protection Act, art 5 (4). 
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application would compromise the collection of data from the data subject”92 but then adds a 
general rider that the exemption only applies “in as far as … necessary to reconcile the right to 
privacy to the rules governing freedom of expression”.93  Belgium law sets out an exemption based 
on a test of minimal substantive content which, therefore, falls within category b/0.17.  In sum, the 
media need not provide the specified information if this would “interfere with the collection of data 
from the data subject”.94  Finally, eleven countries (*Austria, Cyprus,95 Denmark,96 *Finland, 
Germany,97 *Iceland, *Lithuania,98 the Netherlands,99 *Norway, Portugal100 and *Sweden) exempt 
the media from compliance with these rules on an unconditional basis and therefore fall within 
category g/0.  These results are summarized in Chart Two below. 
 
Chart Two: Media Expression and Proactive Direct Transparency Rule 
 
 
 A very similar pattern emerges when the derogations from the proactive transparency rule 
applicable to cases of indirect collection of data are examined (provision (vii)).  Six jurisdictions 
(*Croatia, *Czech Republic, *Hungary, Liechtenstein, Slovenia and *Spain) require the media to 
comply with the Directive’s basic provisions here in full and, therefore, fall within category a/1.  
Whilst this list overlaps considerably with that set out for direct collection, such a similarity hides 
                                                          
92 Luxembourg, Coordinated Text of Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, art 9 (c). 
93 Ibid, art 9.  The article further states that the provisions are “[w]ithout prejudice to provisions laid down in 
the Law of 8 June 2004 on freedom of expression in the media”.  Again, the stipulations of this general media 
statute are outside the scope of this article. 
94 Belgium, Data Protection Act, sec 3 (3) (b). 
95 Cyprus, Processing of Personal Data (Protection of Individuals) Law, sec 11 (5) 
96 Denmark, Compiled Version of the Act on Processing of Personal Data, sec 2. 
97 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, s. 41; Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, art 
57 (1). 
98 Lithuania, Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data, art 8. 
99 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1). 
100 Portugal, Art on the Protection of Personal Data, art 10 (6). 
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significance internal divergence within the grouping in this latter case.  Two jurisdictions (Croatia and 
Liechtenstein) provide that, without any particular safeguards being adopted, such information need 
not be provided if to do so would constitute a disproportionate effort.101  In Spain, suspension 
requires either that such informing to be impossible or for it to be the view of the national Data 
Protection Authority (DPA) or a corresponding regional DPA that compliance with the rule would be 
disproportionate.102  In the Czech Republic the information may only not be provided if “such data 
are necessary to exercise the rights and obligations ensuring from special Acts” or the controller “is 
processing exclusively lawfully published personal data”.103   Even these limitations are removed if 
the legitimating ground relied upon is that the processing is “essential for the protection of the 
rights and legitimate interests” either of himself or another person.104  As explored below, this 
would appear to be the only legitimating ground in Czech law relevant to media expression.  In 
Hungarian law, the requirement to provide information applies on an identical basis to that 
governing the direct collection of data considered above.  Slovenian law requires that the 
information be provided to data subjects in all circumstances.105   No jurisdictions fall within 
category b/0.83 here.  Three jurisdictions (Greece, Italy and Romania) set out category c/0.67 rule-
bound exemptions.  The Greek exemption is identical to that it sets out in the case of direct 
collection considered above.106  In Italy, the provision in the Data Protection Journalism Code 
requiring the media to provide information unless this makes it “impossible for them to carry out 
their journalistic activity” 107 leaves it ambiguous as to whom the information needs to be provided 
to.  Given that the general Italian Data Protection Act does not grant the media an exemption from 
the general transparency provisions,108 a strict interpretation would be that this information needs 
to be provided to the data subject here and not merely to any third party who may be supplying 
data.  In any case, this Code additionally requires that “[i]f personal data are collected from data 
banks used by editorial offices, publishing companies must inform the public at least twice a year, 
through advertisements, of the existence of such data banks” including the address at which they 
can apply to exercise their data protection rights.109  Romanian law provides an exemption only 
where compliance “might affect the confidentiality as to the source of the information”.110  Three 
jurisdictions (*Bulgaria, *Estonia and Slovakia) set out exemptions are provided based on an 
objective, public interest test of a form set out in category d/0.5.  In the case of Slovakia, an 
exemption is available so long as processing is “necessary … for the purposes of informing the public 
                                                          
101 Croatia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 7(4) and Liechtenstein, Data Protection Act, art 5 (4). 
102 Spain, Organic Law 15/10000 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal Data, sec 5 (5).  Interestingly, 
no such stipulation applies if the processing is deemed to be for “for historical, statistical or scientific 
purposes”.  It should be noted that according to sec 5 (4) of the Spanish law the actual provision of information 
to data subject need only take place within three months of its initial recording. 
103 Czech, Consolidated Version of the Personal Data Protection Act, art 11 (3).  It is unclear whether the media 
could point to a “special Act” regulating their processing.  
104 Ibid, art 5 (2) (e).  The law governing legitimating conditions will be explored in a later section of the article. 
105 Slovenia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 19 (3). 
106 Greece, Law 2472/1997 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (as 
amended), art 11.5. Interestingly, the general rules governing transparency in the case of indirect collection of 
data exclude any mention of an exemption on the grounds of disproportionate effort being possible. 
107 Italy, Data Protection Code for Journalism, art 2.1. 
108 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, sec 13. 
109 Italy, Data Protection Journalism Code, art 2.2. 
110 Romania, Law No. 677/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and the Free Movement of Such Data, art 13.6. 
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by means of mass media” but not if the processing “violates the data subject’s right to protection of 
his personal rights and privacy”.111  Eight jurisdictions (*Gibraltar, *France, *Ireland, *Latvia, 
Luxembourg, *Malta, *Poland and the *UK) set out more permissive public interest exemptions in a 
form falling with category e/0.33.  These are identical to that governing direct collection considered 
above, with the exception of Luxembourg where the media can avoid providing information here not 
only when this would “compromise the collection of data” but also when this would compromise “a 
planned publication, or public disclosure in any form whatsoever of the said data, or would provide 
information that would make it possible to identify the sources of information”.112  Again, however, 
Luxembourg law provides that this exemption only applies “in as far as it is necessary to reconcile 
the right to privacy to the rules governing freedom of expression”.113  Similarly to the case of direct 
collection, Belgium law falls within category f/0.17 since the exemption here depends on a test with 
minimal substantive content.  In sum, as long as the rule “interferes with the collection of data”, 
“interferes with intended publication” or “provides indications as to the sources of information”, the 
media may avoid complying.114  Under the same legal provisions as that concerning direct collection 
considered above, eleven countries (*Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, *Finland, Germany, *Iceland, 
*Lithuania, the Netherlands, *Norway, Portugal and *Sweden) exempt the media from compliance 
with these rules on an unconditional basis and therefore fall within category g/0.  These results are 
summarized in Chart Three below. 
 
Chart Three: Media Expression and Proactive Indirect Transparency Rule 
 
                                                          
111 Slovakia, Act on the Protection of Personal Data, sec 10 (3) (a).  It is additionally stated that the exemption 
is not available “if such processing of personal data without consent of the data subject[,] is prohibited by a 
special Act or an international treaty binding for the Slovak Republic”. 
112 Luxembourg, Coordinated Text of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, art 9 (d). 
113 Ibid, art 9. 
114 Belgium, Data Protection Act, art 3 (3) (b). 
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B. Retroactive Transparency (provision (viii)) 
In addition to complying with the proactive transparency rules, controllers are also subject to a 
retroactive transparency rule (provision (viii)) under which they must on request supply data 
subjects “at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense”115 with much more 
extensive information about their processing operations together with communication “in an 
intelligible form of the data undergoing processing”.116 
Turning to media derogations available here, ten jurisdictions (*Bulgaria, *Croatia, Cyprus, 
*Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, *Latvia, *Slovakia, Slovenia and *Spain) apply this law in 
full to media processing and are coded within category a/1.  Italy117 and Romania118 fall within 
category b/0.83 since they set out only a very narrower derogation protecting any confidentiality as 
to the sources of information held by journalists.    Luxembourg and Portugal fall within category 
c/0.67 since they set out a full exception based on compliance with strict rules, namely, that the 
controller agrees to allow the Data Protection Authority vicarious access to the data on the data 
subject’s behalf. 119   One jurisdiction (*Estonia) provides an exemption based on a strict public 
interest test and therefore falls within category d/0.5.  Seven jurisdictions (*France, *Gibraltar, 
*Ireland, Liechtenstein, *Malta, *Poland and the *UK) provide a category e/0.33 exemption which is 
related to but more permissive than a strict public interest test.  In Liechtenstein, the law allows for 
a refusal, restriction or deferral of information provision if “the personal data provides information 
as to its source”, “access to drafts of publications would have to be granted”, “the public’s freedom 
to form an opinion would be compromised” or if the file “is being used exclusively as a personal 
work aid” by an individual journalist as opposed to a wider group within a media organisation.120  
Three countries fall within category f/0.17 since the exemption they set out is not universally 
absolute but either only stipulates a minimal substantive content (Belgium) or even excludes large 
swathes of the media unconditionally from compliance (Denmark and Germany).  In Belgium, an 
exemption is provided not only where this would “provide indications as to the sources of 
information” but also where compliance would “interfere with intended publication”.121  In 
Denmark, the Law on Mass Media Information Databases 1994 provides that in relation to publicly 
available information databases, data subjects must be given “written notice of the information 
recorded in the database relating to him unless it is associated with excessive difficulties to obtain 
                                                          
115 Directive 95/46, art 12 (a). 
116 Ibid, art 12.  The definition of automated individual decisions is given in art. 15. 
117 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, sec 138. 
118 Romania, Law No. 677/2001 on the Protection of Individual with Regard to art 12.6 
119 Thus, s. 29 (3) of the Luxembourg Coordinated Text of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of 
Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data not only provides a full exemption from disclosure of 
sources but also states that other data “must be accessed through the intermediary of the Commissioner 
Nationale pour la Protection des Donnėes in the presence of the Conseil de Presse or his representative, or the 
Chairman of the Conseil de Presse duly called upon.”  Art 11.3 of the Portuguese Act on the Protection of 
Personal Data establishes a similar rule, with art 11.4 adding that if this might prejudice freedom of expression 
and information or the freedom of the press, the Authority will only inform the data subject of any measures 
taken as a result. 
120 Liechtenstein, Data Protection Act, art 13.  Interestingly, all but the last of these exemptions is limited to 
“periodically published” media organs.  However, as this article is exploring the strength as opposed to the 
scope of the free speech derogation in data protection, this issue will not be further pursued. 
121 Belgium, Data Protection Act, sec 3. 
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the information”.122  However, not only are such individuals only entitled to the communication of 
such information at yearly intervals123 but, as detailed above, the definition of such databases 
excludes both databases use internally and even public databases only including already published 
material which fall within the scope of the Danish Media Liability Act.   In Germany, as detailed 
above, only Deutsche Welle and broadcasters regulated by the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and 
Telemedia are subject to substantive data protection provisions.  As regards Deutsche Welle, the 
federal Data Protection Act establishes that if reporting “infringes the privacy of the individual, this 
person may request information about the recorded data relating to him/her on which the reporting 
was based”.  However, such a request may be refused if “the data allow the identification of persons 
who are or were professionally involved as journalists in preparing, producing or disseminating 
broadcasts”, “the data allow the identification of the supplier or source of contributions, documents 
and communications for the editorial part” or if “disclosure of the data obtained by research or 
other means would compromise Deutsche Welle’s journalistic duty by divulging its information 
resources”.124  The provision governing other broadcasters is even more permissive.  Here, the 
Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia states that, whilst a person who is “negatively 
affected in his interests meriting protection” may “demand information on the underlying data 
storage about his person”, such information may be denied not only if the data would allow 
conclusions on either “persons who were involved in the preparation of production or transmission” 
or “the person of the sender or of the guarantor of contributions, documents and communications 
for the editorial section” but also “if its provision would prejudice the journalistic task of the 
broadcaster by exploring the information gathered”.125  Finally, seven countries (*Austria, *Finland, 
*Iceland, *Lithuania, the Netherlands,126 *Norway and *Sweden) exempt the media unconditionally 
from compliance with this rule and therefore fall within category g/0.  Chart Four below summarises 
these results. 
 
Chart Four:  Media Expression and the Retrospective Transparency Rule 
 
                                                          
122 Denmark, Lov om massemediers informationsdatabaser, sec 11 (1). 
123 Ibid, sec 11 (2). 
124 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41. 
125 Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, art 47 (2) and similar wording in art 57 (2). 
126 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1). 
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VI. MEDIA EXPRESSION AND THE SENSITIVE INFORMATION RULES (PROVISIONS (ix)-(xv)) 
 In addition to requiring compliance with the other elements of the data protection regime, 
the Directive stipulates greatly increased protection when data falls within a category which it 
deems to be sensitive due to its relationship with intimate private life and/or the possibility of unfair 
discrimination.  In sum, this element includes seven provisions restricting the processing of data:  
(ix)   revealing racial or ethnic origin 
(x)   revealing political opinions 
(xi)   revealing religious or philosophical beliefs 
(xii)   revealing trade-union membership 
(xiii) concerning health 
(xiv) concerning sex life, and 
(xv)   relating to offences, criminal convictions and security measures. 
These categories of data are intended to be largely exhaustive.127  As regards last data category 
(provision xv), the Directive’s rule, which is subject to no mandatory exceptions, is that the 
processing may only be carried out “under the control of official authority”.128    In relation to the 
first six categories of data (provisions (ix)-(xv)), the Directive’s starting point is that processing must 
be prohibited.129   However, in these cases, Member States are required to provide exclusions from 
this ban in a number of very restricted circumstances.  Only two of these, that the “data subject has 
given his explicit consent to the processing” and that “the processing relates to data which are 
manifestly made public by the data subject” have clear application to the media activities.130  
Moreover, as regards explicit consent, the Directive adds that the ban should remain in place where 
Member State law provides that the prohibition “may not be lifted by the data subject’s giving his 
consent”.131 Member States are also to determine processing operations likely to “present specific 
risks to the rights of freedoms of data subjects” and mandate that they be subject to a checking 
procedure by the DPA prior to such processing beginning.132  As will be seen, some have interpreted 
this provision as allowing, in effect, the imposition of a licensing system for the processing of 
sensitive data, at least when computerised means are used.  Overall, and unsurprisingly, the actual 
default rules governing the processing of sensitive data continue to differ considerably. 
Turning to the derogations available to the media here, with two exceptions (Italy and 
*Latvia) discussed below, Member States have adopted an identical approach vis-à-vis all the data 
categories.  The law in nine jurisdictions (*Croatia, *Czech Republic, Hungary, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Portugal, *Slovakia, Slovenia and *Spain) fail to provide for any media derogation and 
                                                          
127 Art 8.6, Directive 95/46 does state, without further elaboration, that Member States “shall determine the 
conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier of general application may be 
processed”.  This very specific issue is outside the broad scope of interest of this article.  Art 8.5 of the 
Directive also empowers Member States to specially protect data relating to administrative sanctions and 
judgments in civil cases on the same basis as data relating to offences, criminal conditions and security 
measures.  Many of these additional classes of data could in any case be considered to fall within a very broad 
interpretation of provision (xv) and so will not be separately analysed. 
128 Directive 95/46, art 8.3. 
129 Directive 95/46, art 8.1. 
130 Directive 95/46, art 8.2. 
131 Directive 95/46, art 8.2 (a). 
132 Directive 95/46, art 20. 
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therefore must be classified within category a/1.  However, this commonality hides very significant 
divergences as to the general circumstances when the ban on processing sensitive data in the 
private sector may be lifted as a result either of the data subject’s explicit consent or his manifestly 
putting this information into the public domain.  In Hungary, there is no public domain exception 
and any consent must be writing.133  Spanish law excludes any mention of controlling group (xv) data 
vis-à-vis the private sector.  However, as regards the other groupings, it also excludes a public 
domain exemption and further requires that religious or philosophical belief, political opinion and 
trade union membership data processing requires written consent.134  In Lithuania, consent must be 
in a “form giving an unambiguous evidence of the data subject’s free will”135 and, in addition, a prior 
DPA check must take place if sensitive data is to be processed on computer.136  In Portugal, a DPA 
prior check must take place if consent is being relied upon137 and the public domain exception is 
restricted to circumstances where consent for the particular processing in question can be “clearly 
inferred” from this.138  In Slovenia, the public domain exemption only applies if the data subject 
“publicly announces them without any evident or explicit purpose of restricting their use”139 and 
consent must “as a rule be in writing”.140  In Slovakia, consent must always be in writing141 and, in 
any case, no exemption is provided from the stipulation that group (xv) data may only be processed 
“by a person entitled to it by a special Act”.142  Croatian law sets out a full explicit consent and public 
domain exception for data within groups (ix)-(xiv) but as regards group (xv) data it simply states that 
such data must be “solely controlled by the competent authorities”.143  Czech law states as regards 
consent that the controller must be able to prove its existence “during the whole period of 
processing”.144  Liechtenstein law provides a full explicit consent and public domain exemption as 
broad as that set out as a minimum default in the Directive.145  There are no jurisdictions in category 
b/0.83.  The provisions in four jurisdictions (Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Romania) set out a 
media exemption based on the satisfaction of certain pre-determined rule-based criteria and, 
therefore, fall within category c/0.67.  The Greek provisions are particularly onerous.  Here, a permit 
must be requested from the DPA which is to be exceptionally granted but only when “[p]rocessing 
concerns data pertaining to public figures”, “that such data are in connection with the holding of 
public office or the management of third parties’ interests”, “processing is absolutely necessary in 
order to ensure the right to information on matters of public interest, as well as within the 
framework of literary expression” and “provided that the right to protection of privacy and family 
                                                          
133 Hungary, Act CXII of 2011 On Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Information, sec 5 (2)(a). 
134 Spain, Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal Data, art. 7.  The article adds 
that “[f]iles created for the sole purpose of storing personal data which reveal the ideology [political opinion], 
trade union membership, religion, beliefs , racial or ethnic origin or sex life remain prohibited”. 
135 Lithuania, Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data, art 2 (11). 
136 Ibid, art 33.1.1. Processing for very limited purposes such as internal administration is excluded from this 
requirement. 
137 Portugal, Act on the Protection of Personal Data, art 7 (2).   
138 Ibid, art 7 (3) (c). This could be a live issue for the media especially as regards data revealed publicly on 
social networking sites and the like. 
139 Slovenia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 13 (5). 
140 Ibid, art 13 (1). 
141 Slovakia, Act on the Protection of Personal Data, art 9 (1). 
142 Ibid, art 8 (3). 
143 Croatia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 8 (2). 
144 Czech Republic, Consolidated version of the Personal Data Protection Act, art 9 (a). 
145 Liechtenstein, Data Protection Act, art 18 (c). 
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life is not violated in any way whatsoever”.146  In Belgium, an exemption is provided “if the 
processing relates to personal data which has apparently been made public by the data subject or 
which is closely related to the public nature of the data subject or of the facts in which the data 
subject is involved”.147  In Luxembourg, any data must either “have manifestly been made public by 
the data subject himself” or be “directly related to the public life of the data subject or the event in 
which he is involved in a deliberate manner”.148   In Romania, it is necessary that the data are 
“manifestly made public by the data subject or are closely related to the public figure quality of the 
person concerned or the public nature of the facts involved”.149  Three jurisdictions (*Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and *Estonia) are placed within category d/0.5 here since they set out an open-textured 
exemption based on a strict public interest test.  In Cyprus, this exemption applies “as long as the 
right to privacy and family life are not violated”.150  Six jurisdictions (*France, *Gibraltar, *Ireland, 
*Malta, *Poland and the *UK) set out a more permissive public interest exemption which therefore 
falls within category e/0.33.   Two countries fall within category f/0.17 since the exemption set out is 
not universally unconditional but either has minimal substantive content (Netherlands) or excludes 
large swathes of media activity absolutely from these provisions (Denmark).  In the Netherlands, an 
exemption is granted so long as the processing is “necessary” for journalistic purposes.151  In 
Denmark, the Law on Mass Media Information Databases provides that in relation to publicly 
available mass media electronic information databases “[i]nformation on individuals’ purely private 
matters, including information on race, religion, political, fraternal, sexual, criminal record, health, 
serious social problems and the abuse of stimulants and the like, should not be stored in the 
information database after three years from the event that gave rise to the database entry or, if such 
a date cannot be fixed, three years after the information was entered into the database”.152  
However, these provisions do not apply if “there is such an interest that the information is publicly 
available that concern for the individual’s interest in ensuring that the information is erased should 
give way to the interest in freedom of information”.153  Even more critically, as outlined above, the 
definition of publicly available information databases excludes not only internal databases used by 
the mass media but also databases which only include already published text, images, periodicals, 
audio or video programs which fall within the Danish Media Liability Act.154  Six jurisdictions 
(*Austria, *Finland, Germany,155 *Iceland, *Norway and *Sweden) exclude the media 
unconditionally from these provisions and therefore fall within category g/0.   Turning to the two 
                                                          
146 Greece, Law 2472/1997 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data (as 
amended), art 7 (2) (g).  It should further be noted that under Greek data protection law a permit must even 
be obtained if processing data on the basis of consent (which in any case must be written) (art 7 (2) (a)) or 
when such processing is justified by the fact that it relates to data which are manifestly made public by the 
data subject (art 7 (2) (c)). 
147 Belgium, Data Protection Act, art 3 (3) (a). 
148 Luxembourg, Data Protection Act, art 9 (a).  The exemption also only applies in so far as “necessary to 
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression”. 
149 Romania, Law No. 677/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and the Free Movement of Such Data, art 11. 
150 Cyprus, Processing of Personal Data (Protection of Individuals) Law, sec 6 (2) (i). 
151 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (2). 
152 Denmark, Lov om massemediers informationsdatabaser, sec 8(3) (translated from Danish). 
153 Ibid, art 8 (4). 
154 Ibid, sec 1 (1).  This latter Act makes no provision for specially protecting sensitive groupings of information. 
155 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41; Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, 
art 57 (1). 
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exceptional cases, *Latvian law does not provide any exemption the prohibition on private sector 
processing of data relating to offences, criminal convictions and security measures but does provide 
a permissive public interest exemption from the other sensitive data rules.  It therefore must be 
coded a/1 in relation to provision (xv) and e/0.33 in relation to provisions (ix)-(xiv).  Meanwhile, in 
Italy, whilst the media are exempted from the general regime governing sensitive data,156 the Data 
Protection Journalism Code restricts the processing of health and sex life data (groups xiii and xiv) via 
specific rule-bound provisions in the form of category c/0.67, whilst also requiring adherence to an 
objective, public interest test of a category d/0.5 type when using any sensitive data, including data 
falling within the other five categories outlined above.  Thus, the Code states that “[i]n referring to 
the health of an identified or identifiable person, journalists must respect his/her dignity, right to 
privacy and decorum especially in cases of severe or terminal diseases; they must avoid publishing 
analysis data of exclusively clinical interest”157 and also that journalists “must avoid reporting the sex 
life of any identified or identifiable person”.158  However, as a partial caveat it is stated in both cases 
that “[p]ublication is allowed for the purpose of ensuring that all material information is disclosed 
and by respecting a person’s dignity, if such person plays an especially important social or public 
role”.159   More generally, the Code provides that when processing sensitive data “journalists must 
ensure the right to information on facts of public interest, by having regard to the materiality of such 
information, and avoid any reference to relatives or other persons who are not involved in the 
relevant events”160 and also that ““[i]n exercising the rights and duties related to freedom of the 
press, journalists must respect a person’s right to non-discrimination on account of his/her race, 
religion, political opinions, sex, personal circumstances, bodily or mental condition”.161  The 
combined Latvian and Italian scores for the sensitive data rules is 0.43 and 0.55 respectively.  
However, for the purposes of Chart Five below which summarizes the results within this element, 
these scores have been rounded into the nearest whole category of d/0.5. 
 
                                                          
156 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, s. 137. 
157 Italy, Data Protection Journalism Code, art. 10.1. 
158 Ibid, art. 11.1. 
159 Ibid, arts. 10.2 and 11.2. 
160 Italy, Data Protection Journalism Code, art. 5.  The article adds a caveat for the media by stating that “[w]ith 
regard to data concerning circumstances or events that have been known either directly by the persons 
concerned or on account of their public conduct, the right to subsequently provide proof of the existence of 
lawful justification deserving legal protection is hereby left unprejudiced”. 
161 Italy, Data Protection Journalism Code, art. 9. 
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Chart Five:  Media Expression and the Sensitive Data Rules 
 
 
VII.  CONTROL CONDITIONS ELEMENT (PROVISIONS (xvi)-(xviii)) 
 Complementing the provisions detailed above, the Directive also includes three further 
provisions which, whilst imposing obligations of a substantive nature on data controller’s own 
processing operations, are primarily designed to ensure that the other substantive elements of the 
scheme are not undermined.  These subsidiary provisions, and the media derogations from them, 
are considered in this section. 
 
A.  Legitimating Ground Condition (provision (xvi)) 
 Under the Directive personal data may not be processed unless one or more of legitimizing 
grounds set out in article 7 are satisfied.   Although the first of these is data subject consent, this 
article also sets out five other potential grounds.  Whilst these are generally also quite restrictive, 
the sixth ground is open-textured, legitimising processing which is “necessary for the purposes of the 
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are 
disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject which require protection”.162  The inclusion of such an all-
encompassing condition underscores the fact that, in contrast to article 8 of the Directive regulating 
sensitive data, it is not the purpose of article 7 to provide for a special regime for data processing.  
Rather, by specifying in a closed and structured form “the grounds on which personal data may 
lawfully be processed”,163 its aim is to undergird compliance with the fair and lawful processing and 
legitimate purposes requirements in the first and second data quality principles (provisions (i) and 
(ii)) considered above. 
 Turning to the derogations set out for the media, twelve jurisdictions (Belgium, *Croatia, 
Cyprus, *Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, *Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and 
*Spain) do not provide for any derogation and, therefore, fall within category a/1.  Many of these 
                                                          
162 Directive 95/46, art 7 (f). 
163 European Commission (n 19), 16. 
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countries also set out the legitimating grounds using slightly different wording to that the Directive, 
often thereby prioritising the use of the first condition of data subject consent in some way.164  
Spanish law goes much further by generally preventing the open-textured condition being relied 
upon when data are communicated to third parties unless that data in question have been collected 
from publicly available sources.165  Liechtenstein law falls within category b/0.83 since it does not 
exempt the media from the need to satisfy a legitimating condition but rather glosses this by stating 
that in applying the sixth open-textured condition “the overriding interests of the processing person 
shall in particular be taken into account where the processing person … processes data on a 
professional basis for the sole purpose of publication in the editorially-controlled section of a 
published media organ”.166   Two jurisdictions (Italy and Romania) provide an exemption which is 
available only if certain specific circumstances or rules as defined by category c/0.67 are satisfied.  In 
Italy, the media are excluded from compliance with the general legitimating grounds,167  but must 
adhere to provisions as regards the materiality of information,168 protection of a person’s 
residence,169 protection of children170 and protection of personal dignity171 set out in the Data 
Protection Journalism Code.  In Romania, an exemption is only available when and in so far as data is 
“manifestly made public by the data subject or are closely related to the public figure quality of the 
personal concerned or the public nature of the facts involved”.172  Three jurisdictions (*Bulgaria, 
*Estonia and Slovakia) provide for an exemption based on an objective, public interest test and, 
therefore, fall within category d/0.5.  Whilst Slovakian law does not set out a precise cognate of the 
sixth open-textured provision, it does specifically authorise processing “necessary … for the purpose 
of informing the public by means of mass media” unless if “by processing of personal data for such 
purpose the controller violates the data subject’s right to protection of his personal rights and 
privacy”.173  Six jurisdictions (*Gibraltar, *Ireland, *Latvia, *Malta, *Poland and the *UK) include a 
more permissive, public interest exemption in their law as set out in category e/0.33.  No countries 
                                                          
164 This is sometimes coupled with language which explicitly sets a somewhat higher threshold to the use of 
alternative legitimating conditions.  For example, the Greek Data Protection Act not only sets out a 
presumption that data consent will be obtained (art 5 (1)) but also provides that the open-textured equivalent 
of article 7(1)(g) in the Directive may only be utilized when processing is “absolutely necessary” for the 
purposes of a legitimate interest (art 5 (2) (e)). 
165 Spanish, Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal Data, art 11.  These provisions 
were recently held to be invalid by the CJEU in C-468/10 and C-469/10 Asociación Nacional de 
Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and another v Administración del Estado, EU:C:2011:777. 
166 Liechtenstein, Data Protection Act, art 17.2 (d). 
167 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, sec 171.2.  Again, interpretation of this exemption is complicated by 
the fact that, similarly to Spain, general use of the open-textured condition is excluded if processing involves 
“dissemination of the data” (sec 24 (f)) unless the processing “concerns data taken from public registers, 
documents or records that are publicly available, without prejudice to the limitations and modalities laid down 
by laws, regulations and Community legislation with regard to their disclosure and publicity” (sec 24 (c)). 
168 Italy, Data Protection Journalism Code, art 6. 
169 Ibid, art 3. 
170 Ibid, art 7. 
171 Ibid, art 8. 
172 Romania, Law No. 677/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and the Free Movement of such Data, art 11. 
173 Slovakia, Act on the Protection of Personal Data, sec 10 (3) (a).  This provision also stipulates that such an 
exemption is also not available “if such processing of personal data without consent of the data subject is 
prohibited by a special Act or an international treaty binding for the Slovak Republic”. 
29 
 
fall within category f/0.17.  Finally, eight jurisdictions (*Austria, Denmark,174 *Finland, Germany,175 
*Iceland, Netherlands,176 *Norway and *Sweden) provide for an unconditional media exemption 
here and, therefore, fall within category g/0.  These outcomes are summarized in Chart Six below. 
 
Chart Six:  Media Expression and the Legitimating Ground Provision 
 
 
B. Notification of Processing Condition (provision (xvii)) 
Section IX of the Directive generally requires the controller to provide the DPA with a 
registration of their processing operations, the details of which are then to be placed on a public 
register.177  At a minimum, such registration must include at least the name and address of the 
controller, the purpose or purposes of processing, the category of categories of data subject and the 
data or categories of data relating to them which are processed, the recipients or categories of 
recipient to whom the data might be disclosed, proposed transfers of data to third countries and a 
general description of measures taken to ensure security of processing.178  Member States need not 
require such registration where the data controller appoints an independent personal data 
protection official or where the processing has been specified in detail and is deemed unlikely “to 
affect adversely the rights and freedoms of data subjects” or where the processing of data is not 
computerized.179  However, even in these cases, Member States are obliged to ensure that 
controllers provide a notification to any person on request including the information which would 
otherwise be on the public register.180  These provisions were designed to instantiate the two core 
control purposes of providing a basic minimum of openness in data processing, thus undergirding 
the first data principle’s fair and lawful processing requirements, and providing a structure “to serve 
                                                          
174 Denmark, Compiled Version of the Act on Processing of Personal Data, sec 2. 
175 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, s. 41; Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, 
art 57 (1). 
176 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1). 
177 Directive 95/46, art 21.2.  In order to ensure that the relevant measures are not undermined, notification 
related to the security of processing is excluded from this publicity requirement. 
178 Directive 95/46, art 19. 
179 Directive 95/46, art 18. 
180 Directive 95/46, art 21.3. 
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as the basis for selective monitoring of the legitimacy of processing operations by the supervisory 
authority”.181 
 As regards the media derogations available, ten jurisdictions (*Croatia, Cyprus, *Czech 
Republic, *Estonia, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, *Spain and the *UK) set out no special 
provision in favour of the media here and, therefore, fall within category a/1.  In almost all these 
countries either all or at least the vast majority of computerized processing is subject to registration 
with the national DPA.  However, in Estonia, registration is only required when processing sensitive 
data182 and, even in these cases, data controllers may alternatively notify the DPA of the 
appointment of an independent data protection officer.183  Provisions in Denmark, France and Latvia 
provide only for exemptions of a very narrow scope and, therefore, fall within category b/0.83.  In 
Denmark, the Law on Mass Media Information Databases requires that the mass media notify the 
DPA of all internal editorial mass media electronic information databases and that the latter publish 
an annual list of these.   Publicly available mass media information databases are also subject to 
notification both to the DPA and the Press Council.184  Databases which only include already 
published text, images, periodicals, audio or video programs are excluded from these 
requirements.185  In France the media must notify the DPA of the appointment of an independent 
Data Protection Officer and that person must maintain a register of processing carried out by the 
data controller.186  In Latvia, an exemption is only available if no data on a person’s health or 
offences, criminal convictions and administration violation cases are to be processed and if no data 
are to be transferred outside the EEA.187  In Liechtenstein a general exemption is provided for but 
this is dependent on compliance with specific pre-defined category c/0.67 rules, specifically, that 
files “are being used by journalists exclusively as a personal work aid” or “used exclusively for 
publication in the editorially-controlled section of a periodically-published media organ” but in this 
case not if data is “disclosed to third parties without the knowledge of the data subjects”. 188  
*Bulgaria provides an exemption here on the basis of an objective, public interest test as defined in 
category d/0.5.  *Gibraltar, *Malta and *Poland provide for an exemption based on a more 
permissive public interest test as set out in category e/0.33.  No jurisdiction falls within category 
f/0.17.  Fourteen jurisdictions (*Austria, Belgium, *Finland, Germany,189 Hungary,190 *Iceland, 
                                                          
181 European Commission (n 19), 28. 
182 Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, sec 27. 
183 Ibid, sec 30.  Such a person must keep a register of processing carried out by the data controller (s. 30 (3)).  
However, in tension with the Directive, there appears to be no requirement placed on either these data 
controllers, or others not subject to registration, to make such information available to any member of the 
public on request. 
184 Denmark, Lov om massemediers informationsdatabaser, sec 3 and sec 6.  In both cases the notifiable 
information is of a rather narrower than that required generally under the information notification 
requirement. 
185 Ibid, sec 1 (1). 
186 France, Data Protection Act, art 67. 
187 Latvia, Personal Data Protection Law, sec 21 (2) (3) and sec 21 (3). 
188 Liechtenstein, Data Protection Ordinance, art 4. 
189 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41; Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, 
art 57 (1). 
190 Hungary, Act CXII of 2011 on Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Information, sec 65 (3) (g).  
It should be noted that the exemption is not only limited to media service providers (a question concerning the 
definitional scope of the media which is outside the purview of this article) but is limited to processing “which 
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*Ireland, Italy,191 *Lithuania, Luxembourg,192 Netherlands,193 *Norway, Slovenia194 and *Sweden) 
grant the media an unconditional exemption here and therefore are placed in category g/0.  These 
results are summarised in Chart Seven below. 
 
Chart Seven:  Media Expression and the Notification of Processing Requirement 
 
 
C. Data Export Condition (provision (xviii)) 
Article 25 of the Directive requires that Member States generally ensure that personal data 
cannot be transferred to a country outside the EEA unless than country ensures an “adequate level 
of protection” in relation to that data.  Apart from “where otherwise provided by domestic law 
governing particular cases”, Member States are required under article 26 to provide that this rule is 
not applicable when at least one of certain restrictive criteria is satisfied such as unambiguous data 
subject consent or the necessity of transfer on “important public interest grounds”.  The provision as 
a whole was intended to ensure that the pan-EU scheme for protecting personal data could not be 
“nullified by transfers to other countries in which the protection provided is inadequate”195 and in 
most EEA States is secured through strict bureaucratic arrangements overseen by the DPA.  Given 
the intrinsically global nature of many data processing operations, the provision can impose a variety 
of additional substantive duties on data controllers including potentially restricting the 
circumstances in which information can be subject to worldwide electronic publication.196 
                                                          
exclusively serve their own information activities”.  This could be read as imposing certain restrictions on the 
use of this exemption. 
191 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, sec 37 (journalism excluded from listing of types of processing 
requiring notification). 
192 Luxembourg, Coordinated Text of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, art 12 (2) (d). 
193 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1). 
194 Slovenia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 7 (3). 
195 European Commission (n 19), 34. 
196 At least as regards individuals posting material on the internet, the CJEU in Lindqvist (2003) appeared to 
restrict the circumstances in which an individual would themselves be responsible for a transfer of data when 
they uploaded information onto an internet server maintained by a hosting provider established within the EU 
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Turning to the derogations available for the media here, eleven jurisdictions (*Croatia, 
Cyprus, *Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, *Ireland, *Latvia, Liechtenstein, Portugal, *Slovakia and 
*Spain) do not set out any special provisions and, therefore, fall within category a/1.  Most of these 
countries require that at least the great majority of transfers are notified to the DPA and, absent the 
transfer country itself or the particular protections utilized (e.g. contractual undertakings) having 
already been explicitly held adequate, subject to a prior authorization procedure.197   Others are 
rather more liberal198 including one (Ireland) which places a strong emphasis on data controllers 
themselves establishing that the adequacy standard has been met in relation to any particular 
transfer.199  No national provisions fall within category b/0.83.  Romanian law falls within category 
c/0.67 since the exemption here depends on certain pre-defined conditions being met, namely that 
“the data were made public expressly by the data subject or are related to the data subject’s public 
quality or to the public character of the fact’s he/she is involved in”.200  *Bulgaria and *Estonia set 
out an exemption based on an objective, public interest test defined in category d/0.5.  In six 
jurisdictions (*France,*Gibraltar, Luxembourg, *Malta, *Poland, and the *UK) an exemption is 
available on the basis of a more permissive public interest test which falls within category e/0.33.  
The Luxembourg provision is particularly light touch since the only restriction set out is that it applies 
only “in as far as … necessary to reconcile the right to privacy to the rules governing freedom of 
expression”. 201  No national provisions fall within category f/0.17.  Twelve jurisdictions (*Austria, 
Belgium,202 Denmark,203 Finland,204 Germany,205 *Iceland, Italy,206 *Lithuania, Netherlands,207 
*Norway, Slovenia208 and *Sweden) exclude the media unconditionally from this provision and 
therefore fall within category g/0.   These results are summarized in Chart Eight below. 
                                                          
(at [72]).   Nevertheless, this narrower holding has not altered the general understanding which DPAs have 
adopted to the relationship between global publication and the transfer regime.  For example, the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office states clearly that a data controller will be liable for an international 
transfer when information is “loaded onto the internet with the intention that the data be accessed in a third 
country” and a transfer then takes place (UK, Information Commission’s Office ‘The eighth data protection 
principle and international transfers’ (2010) <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1566/international_transfers_legal_guidance.pdf>. 
 
 
197 See for example, Cyprus, Processing of Personal Data (Protection of Individuals) Law, sec 9 (1) and Portugal, 
Act on the Protection of Personal Data, art 19 (3).   The exact requirements, however, do differ.   
198 For example, in Spain, it would appear that only the prior authorization requirement applies and not the 
general requirement of specific notification of transfers (Spain, Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the 
Protection of Personal Data, arts 33 & 34). 
199 Ireland, Data Protection Act, sec 11. 
200 Romania, Data Protection Act. art 29.6. 
201 Luxembourg, Coordinated Text of the Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, art 9.  The article further states that exemption is “[w]ithout prejudice to 
provisions laid down in the Law of 8 June 2004 on freedom of expression in the media”.  The stipulations of 
this general media statute, however, are outside the scope of this article. 
202 Belgium, Data Protection Act, art 3 (3). 
203 Denmark, Compiled Version of the Act on Processing of Personal Data, sec 2. 
204 Finland, Personal Data Act, sec 2 (5). 
205 Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41; Germany, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia, 
art 57 (1). 
206 Italy, Personal Data Protection Code, sec 137 (1) (c). 
207 Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1). 
208 Slovenia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 7 (3). 
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Chart Eight:  Media Expression and the Data Export Provision 
 
 
VIII.  INTEGRATED RESULTS 
 Given that the previous sections have now outlined the approaches taken vis-à-vis the media 
to all the substantive data protection provisions, it is possible to compile a comprehensive picture of 
the derogations in each EEA jurisdiction’s law both in relation to each of the four substantive 
elements of EU data protection and as regards this regime as a whole.  Since, with a few minor 
deviations, Member States have adopted the same internal approach to all the provisions within the 
data quality principles and sensitive data elements respectively, Charts One and Five above have 
effectively already provided such a comprehensive picture in relation to these two elements which, 
moreover, can still be based directly on our seven ordered categories.   In relation to the other two 
elements and the results as a whole, however, the divergences of result between the provisions 
means that the numerical scores generated no longer precisely map on to the ordered categories.  
Despite this, the existence of our standardized 0, 1 scale still ensures that these scores similarly 
represent the extent to which that aspect of data protection remains applicable vis-à-vis the media.  
Charts Nine and Ten below provide a summary of the numerical scores for the transparency rules 
and control conditions respectively, rounded to the nearest 0.1.   
 
Chart Nine:  Media Expression and the Transparency Rules 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0/(g) 0.17/(f) 0.33/(e) 0.5/(d) 0.67/(c) 0.83/(b) 1/(a)
N
um
be
r o
f J
ur
isd
ic
tio
ns
Continued Applicability of Data Protection (0 - 1 Ordered Scale - see Table One)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
≤ 0.1 ≤ 0.2 ≤ 0.3 ≤ 0.4 ≤ 0.5 ≤ 0.6 ≤ 0.7 ≤ 0.8 ≤ 0.9 ≤ 1
N
um
be
r o
f J
ur
isd
ic
tio
ns
Continued Applicability of Data Protection (0 -1 Ordered Scale)
34 
 
Chart Ten:  Media Expression and the Control Rules 
 
 
These four charts highlight the serious divergence of approach between the EEA States here.  
Only in relation to the data quality principles (Chart One) have even a slight majority (56%) of 
Member States adopted the same approach, in this case that the principles should remain fully 
applicable even in the media sphere.  There is no evidence of any overarching European pattern in 
relation to the sensitive data rules (Chart Five), the transparency rules (Chart Nine) or the control 
conditions (Chart Ten).  Instead, there is some evidence of a clumping not only in the middle but also 
at the extremes of both full and no protection.   Even at the individual provision level, it is striking 
that, aside from the data quality principles, there is no case where a majority of states have been 
coded into the same category.  Moreover, the provisions which come nearest to this – the 
legitimating ground condition (provision (xvi)) (38% placed in category a/1), notification of 
processing condition (provision (xvii)) (44% placed in category g/0) and data export condition 
(provision (xviii)) (38% placed in category g/0) – point less to a commonality of approach than to 
evidence of a polarized outcome.  For example, whilst as regards provision (xviii), 38% of states are 
placed in category g/0, 34% are placed in the polar opposite category of a/1. 
Finally, and most crucially, the analysis of the derogations from each of the data protection 
elements must be combined in order to come up with an overall measure of extent to which the 
European data protection regime remains applicable even vis-à-vis media expression.  As highlighted 
at the beginning of sub-section 1.2, all of the core elements of EU data protection have the potential 
to significantly impact the media.  Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the three control 
provisions are mainly designed to perform the subsidiary function of supporting the other data 
protection elements.  Therefore, whilst the control element should not be excluded from the 
analysis entirely, it would also be wrong to give it the same emphasis as the three primary elements.  
To reflect this, in drawing up the final measure, the four data protection elements were weighed 
according to a 3:3:3:1 ratio, the control element being the last category.  Clearly, any approach to 
weighing data protection elements and provisions inevitably reflects value judgments. Nevertheless, 
it should be emphasised that adopting alternative approaches to combining the results make almost 
no overall difference.209  Chart Eleven overleaf summarises these final results for each EEA 
                                                          
209 To check the stability of the overall result, four models were run, namely (i) the model as outlined, (ii) a 
model weighing the four data protection elements equally, (ii) a model simply averaging all eighteen data 
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jurisdiction.  This chart usefully highlights evidence of an interesting and striking pattern within 
Europe.  In sum, within a few exceptions, the laws of Eastern and Latin European countries provide 
little or no formal derogation for the media, whilst Northern European countries tend to grant 
extensive or even absolute derogations in this area.    At the same time, and relatedly, these results 
strongly confirm the total absence of even a minimal harmonisation or consensus across Europe as a 
whole.
                                                          
protection principles, (iv) a model giving double weighting to the data protection rules elements (regarding 
transparency and sensitive data) and treating the other elements equally.  The models resulted in very similar 
average scores:  (i) 0.54, (ii) 0.53, (ii) 0.54 and (iv) 0.51.  Moreover, as regards the relative position of the 
jurisdictions, the alternative models resulted in at most two countries shifting by more than two positions as 
compared with the model eventually used.  These were the Netherlands and Slovenia in the case of (ii), 
Lithuania and Portugal in the case of (iii) and the Netherlands in the case of (iv). 
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Chart Eleven:  Media Expression and the EU Data Protection Regime 
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IX.  CONCLUSIONS AND REFORM 
 As the the results of this empirical survey have indicated, within the area of media 
expression, the formal data protection law within EEA jurisdictions currently display extreme 
diversity.   This is clearly troubling from at least two perspectives - the integrity of the pan-European 
nature of the regime and the effective realisation of fundamental human rights.  Turning to the 
internal integrity aspect first, the EU Directive is designed to establish a common system of data 
protection across Europe in which Member States are obliged to neither restrict nor prohibit the 
free flow of personal data for data protection reasons210 and, so long as data processing is only 
taking place within the context of an establishment in another Member State, also to desist from 
applying their own data protection law to a controller’s activities.  As Recital 8 of the Directive 
states, such a system requires that “the level of protection of the rights and freedoms with regard to 
the processing of such data … be equivalent in all Member States”.  However, this study has 
conclusively indicated that once data processing falls within what a Member State defines as media 
freedom of expression, then evidence of even minimal harmonization, let alone equivalency, proves 
elusive.  What is illegal to collect, store and publish under one country’s data protection law is 
perfectly legal under the data protection law of another.  In the context of the exponential growth of 
new internet services, this hole in the system of harmonization is far from trivial.   Thus, although 
detailed consideration of the scope of media expression is outside the scope of this article, it bears 
notice that activities as diverse as publication of a vast database of criminal records searchable by 
name, social security number of geographical location211 and the rolling out a map service including 
street-level images of identifiable individuals212 have been held in some parts of the EEA to fall 
within the scope of the derogations found within Article 9 of the Directive.  Moreover, often it is the 
Member States with the most substantively lax approach to regulation of such specially protected 
expression who also adopt the broadest understanding of its scope.213  In any case, it is also 
undeniable that even as regards core media activity “data processing is now inseparable from news 
production”.214  Extreme legislative diversity provides a near blueprint for the evasion of even 
perfectly legitimate national restrictions.  This naturally encourages a wider interpretation of the 
circumstances where a cross-border data controller will be deemed to be established in multiple 
Member States.  Such a result was exemplified by the decision of national DPAs to subject Google 
Street View to the data protection laws of each of the Member States in which it was operating.215   
Whilst understandable from the perspective of protecting national regimes, such a fissiparous result 
                                                          
210 Directive 95/46, art 1.1. 
211 Radio Sweden, “Demand for law change after Lexbase launch” (2014) 
<http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=5768451>. 
212 Gräslund, Göran, 'Debatt viktig om grundläggande rättigheter [Debate on important fundamental rights]' 
DIalog  
(June 2010) <http://www.datainspektionen.se/Documents/magasindirekt/magasindirekt-10-01.pdf>. 
213 See the data presented in D. Erdos, ‘Exploring the Expansive yet Diverse Interpretative Stance of European 
Data Protection Authorities as regards Freedom of Expression on the “New Media”’ (forthcoming) European 
Law Review.  
214 Keller (n 6), 331. 
215 For the full out of such an approach see Electronic Privacy Information Center, Investigations of Google 
Street View (2010) <http://epic.org/privacy/streetview/> 
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certainly detracts from the aim of creating a common European data protection space which is “not 
limited to minimal harmonisation but amounts to harmonisation which is generally complete”.216 
  Even more worryingly, many of the outcomes observed clearly fail to do justice to the 
fundamental rights which are engaged.  The European data protection scheme has the self-avowed 
objective of ensuring that, “with respect to the processing of personal data”, “the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy” are protected.217  
Media processing of personal data can undoubtedly pose a serious threat both to an individual’s 
right to privacy and to a range of other individual rights such as non-discrimination and the right to 
reputation.  The disturbing events concerning the hacking and blagging of private personal data 
which prompted the setting up in the UK of the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics 
of the Press in 2011 is but a singular instance of this.218  Media processing also poses in a particularly 
acute form a tension between data protection and freedom of expression.  Therefore, the essential 
thrust of the Directive in mandating a “balance between fundamental rights” here is undoubtedly 
correct.219  Nevertheless, a large number of Member States have manifestly failed to set out such a 
balance in statutory law, with outcomes ranging from subjecting the media to entirely inappropriate 
peremptory rules to completely erasing all individual’s substantive data protection rights once they 
come into conflict with media expression.  In democratic societies whose structures are purportedly 
underpinned by an open discussion on all matters of public concern,220 it is self-evidently shocking 
that, irrespective of the public interest engaged, the media might be legally incapable of processing 
data which falls within broadly defined sensitive information categories unless the data subject 
himself is deciding to make this public or has explicitly agreed to the processing.  Similarly, it is 
clearly unacceptable that in all circumstances the media might be unable to collect any personal 
data from the data subject without being explicit about this collection.  However, as section 6 and 
section 5.1 of this article have elucidated, this is respectively the rule which 28% and 19% of the EEA 
jurisdictions' data protection laws set out.  Similarly, given the purposes of the pan-European data 
protection regime, it cannot be right to exempt the media from any substantive data protection 
liability irrespective of its impact on the data subject and no matter how unfair their processing of 
personal data might be.  However, that anarchic result is the reality in the data protection laws of 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and, at least as regards the Press, also Germany.221 
 Since 2012, Europe has been debating a proposal from the European Commission to replace 
the existing Data Protection Directive with a new General Data Protection Regulation.222  This was 
prompted by concern that continuing disparities between Member States had resulted in a 
“fragmented legal environment which has created legal uncertainty and uneven protection for 
                                                          
216 C-468/10 and C-469/10 Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) at [29]. 
217 Directive 95/46, art 1. 
218 United Kingdom, Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press:  Report, 
London:  Stationary Office (2012). 
219 Directive 95/46, recital 42. 
220 Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843 at [68]. 
221 Such a complete exemption remains a demand of many of those lobbying on behalf of the European media.  
See European Newspaper Publishers’ Association, “Newspaper publishers warn of risk to press freedom and 
distribution in proposed EU Data Protection Regulation” (2013) <http://www.enpa.be/en/news/newspaper-
publishers-warn-of-risk-to-press-freedom-and-distribution-in-proposed-eu-data-protection-
regulation_109.aspx>. 
222 European Commission, Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, COM (2012) 11 final. 
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individuals” and also “unnecessary costs and administrative burdens for businesses”.223  Vice-
President Viviane Reding even stressed the need for a “more coordinated approach at EU level” vis-
à-vis new ‘media’ activities such as “online mapping services including pictures of streets and 
people’s homes”.224  Despite this, there is little evidence that this proposal will ameliorate the 
fragmentation, legal uncertainty and uneven protection which have arisen under Article 9 of the 
Directive as analysed here.  To the contrary, the Commission’s suggested replacement of Article 9 
which is found in Article 80 of its proposed Regulation adopted even more discretionary language 
requiring Member States to provide derogations in this area not “only in so far as necessary”225 but 
rather simply “in order to reconcile”226 the fundamental rights engaged.   This abandonment of the 
necessity standard was reversed by the European Parliament’s legislative resolution of 12 March 
2014 which proposed mandating Member States to provide derogations “whenever it is necessary in 
order to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the rules governing freedom of 
expression in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”.227  
Similarly, the Council has now suggested requiring Member States to provide derogations “if they 
are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of 
expression and information”.228  Despite this, there is little reason to think that the simple retention 
of the necessity standard in the new Regulation, of even the explicit reference to the Charter found 
in the Parliament text, would make much difference to the extremely fissiparous status quo.229 In 
contrast to this, in January 2013 the European Commission’s High Level Group on Media Freedom 
and Pluralism did state that, in the light of the evolving nature of the European media landscape, it 
was “particularly important to adopt minimum harmonization rules covering cross-border media 
activities on areas such as … data protection”.230  Given the present political climate, however, such 
                                                          
223 European Commission, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World:  A European Data Protection Framework 
for the 21st Century, COM (2012) 9 final, 7. 
224 Reding, Viviane,  'Privacy matters - Why the EU needs new personal data protection rules [speaking notes]' 
(2010)  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-700_en.htm?locale=en>. 
225 Directive 95/46, art 9. 
226 Proposed Regulation (n 222), art 80. 
227 European Parliament, Legislative Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the Proposal for a General Data 
Protection Regulation <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0212&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0402>.  In referring to a general reconciliation between data protection 
and freedom of expression, the Parliament’s wording also clearly expanded the scope of this clause well 
beyond journalism and similarly special forms of expression.  For an analysis of some of the conceptual 
difficulties of this approach see D Erdos, ‘From the Scylla of Restriction to the Charybdis of Licence?  Exploring 
the Scope of the “Special Purposes” Freedom of Expression Shield in European Data Protection’ (2015) 52 
Common Market Law Review 144-151. 
228 Council of the EU, Document 15395/14 (Annex) (19 December 2014), art 80.2 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15395-2014-INIT/en/pdf>. 
229 In this regard, it should be noted that, during the final reading on the Parliament’s Resolution, the 
Rapporteur on the Regulation Jan Albrecht MEP stated “The existing data protection law already provides for 
reconciliation of data protection and freedom of expression by the Member States, which is exactly what we 
ensure in Article 80. Nothing will change for journalists in this regard, and the same is true for other special 
professions, for example researchers and archivists.”  European Parliament, Debates, 11 March 2014 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20140311&secondRef=ITEM-
013&language=EN> .  This conservative statement may partly be explained by the strong pressure which media 
organisations were exerting at this time for a complete and absolute exemption from the Regulation. 
230 European Commission, High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, A Free and Pluralistic Media to 
Sustain European Democracy (2013) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-
agenda/files/HLG%20Final%20Report.pdf)>. 
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a specific, sectoral initiative seems at best a project for the longer-term.  Nevertheless, in the light of 
the findings of this article, it is imperative that any new European data protection framework 
explicitly lays down in the main body of the text not only that Member States must adopt 
derogations in their law vis-à-vis media expression but that such derogations not only meet a 
threshold of necessity but also genuinely provide for an effective and proportionate balancing 
between fundamental rights in this area.  Member States should credibly commit to ensuring that 
such thresholds are met within their law, an obligation which would be aided by at least informal 
consultation amongst themselves during the process of transposition.  Ultimately, these 
requirements should be subject to monitoring and, if necessary, enforcement by the European 
Commission and Court of Justice of the European Union.231  Action along these lines would go some 
way to addressing the currently seriously deficient interface between European data protection and 
journalistic expression.  Absent such reform, however, this interface will remain fundamentally out 
of balance, undermining the development of a common information space, certainty in the law and 
the secure enjoyment of individual human rights in Europe.
                                                          
231 Or in the case of the affiliated EEA members, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court. 
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Appendix One:  Applicability of EU Data Protection Provisions vis-à-vis Media Expression (cf. Table One) 
 
 
